

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT****Routing Slip**

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1	DCI				
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15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA		X		
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**SUSPENSE** \_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Remarks:

Executive Secretary

20 Apr 82

Date


3637 (10-81)

State Dept. review completed



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



UNCLASSIFIED  
(SECRET ATTACHMENT)

April 19, 1982

Interdepartmental Group No. 13

MEMORANDUM TO: OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke ---- 8210870  
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler --- 8210871  
ACDA - Mr. Joseph Presel ----- 8210872  
CIA - [redacted]  
DOE - Mr William Vitale ----- 8210874  
JCS - MAJ Dennis Stanley ----- 8210875  
OSD - COL John Stanford ----- 8210876  
OSTP - Dr. George Keyworth ----- 8210877

STAT

SUBJECT: IG Study on Nuclear Testing Issues

Attached is a revised page two of the options paper submitted in response to NSSD 7-82. It corrects an error in the third line of that page.

*L. Paul Bremer, II*  
L. Paul Bremer, II  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:  
As stated.

UNCLASSIFIED  
(WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT)

L118  
NSSD 7-82

**SECRET**

- 2 -

Option 2: Endorse a CTB as a long-term goal and avoid an assertion that nuclear testing is indispensable as long as the US depends on nuclear weapons.

The presentation of Administration arms control policy over the next several weeks will shape public attitudes for months to come. At a time when US arms control policy is the subject of intense scrutiny, both here and with our Allies, it is essential that we avoid forfeiting political credibility and support through a repudiation of a CTB and insistence on a requirement to continue nuclear testing indefinitely, as Option 1 suggests.

Endorsing a CTB as a long-term goal and continuing nuclear testing is an internally consistent policy, one supported by every Administration since Eisenhower and one which will win broad understanding both at home and with our Allies. Our approach will be candid and forthright, clearly stating legitimate reasons for not seeking a CTB now; we will specify concerns regarding verification, Soviet compliance with other arms control agreements, and the need to respond to the Soviet military build-up.

It would be a logical fallacy and political error to tie our unwillingness to resume CTB negotiations to a single factor -- the need to maintain the reliability of nuclear weapons -- and to aggressively assert our unwillingness to ever consider resuming such negotiations as long as this one factor persists. But the American people, and those of other nations, will never understand or accept a rationale for continued US nuclear testing which does not tie our testing to the testing of other powers, specifically the Soviet Union. To suggest, as Option 1 does, that the US would need to test its nuclear weapons indefinitely, even in the unlikely event that every other nation in the world had ceased its own testing for all time, would invite ridicule in the more critical American and international fora in which such policy will be examined.

As a result, agencies supporting Option 2 believe our refusal to resume CTB negotiations should be tied to all the relevant factors -- verification, Soviet behavior, as well as stockpile reliability.

In sum, repudiating a 30-year US policy and walking away from a CTB on the grounds that nuclear testing is necessary and stating this policy publicly (as in Option 1) will:

-- be perceived as an outright rejection of CTB and a giant step backward in arms control, unnecessarily antagonizing public opinion here and in Europe;

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RDS-1 4/19/98